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COMMENTS
THE SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT
INCENTIVE ACT OF 1980 AND VENTURE
CAPITAL FINANCING
I. Introduction
The small business community' is a diverse component of the
national economy and is very often the leader in developing new
technology, products and services.' Traditionally, small businesses
do not raise capital in the conventional public markets; rather,
they generally receive their capital from that sector of the invest-
ment community referred to as the venture capital industry.' The
principal activities of a venture capital company consist of invest-
ing4 in,5 and providing managerial assistance to small growing busi-
1. Although there is no precise mathematical definition of what constitutes a small busi-
ness, for purposes of this Comment the small business community includes new, small busi-
nesses, family and locally-owned and operated, and medium-sized, independent businesses.
There are approximately twelve million such small businesses in the United States-more
than 97% of all American companies. Report: "America's Small Business Economy Agenda
for Action": Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1980) (estimates taken from Dun and Bradstreet) [hereinafter cited as 1980 White House
Conference Report].
2. A study by the Office of Management and Budget shows that more than half of the
major technological advances of the 20th century originated from small companies and indi-
vidual investors. 1980 White House Conference Report, id. at 21. The majority of present-
day venture capital has flowed to advanced technology companies, with a special emphasis
on computer equipment, telecommunications, medical innovations and genetic engineering.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1981, at D9, col. 2.
3. See notes 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
4. Financial experts invariably assert that new technology-based companies should be
financed primarily with equity. See M. KIESCHNICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT 49 (1979) [hereinafter cited as VeruRE CAPITAL). Simply stated, equity is the right of
the investor to a share of income after all costs have been paid. Id: See also note 19 infra.
5. See note 23 infra and accompanying text. Investors in venture capital companies ex-
pect that their investments must be held for a period of years before significant capital
appreciation is likely to occur. Since the enterprises in which venture capital companies
invest are in the embryonic stages of development, any initial earnings made by these enter-
prises are put back into the enterprise for future growth rather than disbursed in the form
of dividends. Hence, investors are not looking for current yields but the eventual realization
of long-term capital gains. In the late 1960's, venture capitalists made substantial profits by
being able to sell their shares in young, developing companies at high multiples of their
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nesses. In return, the venture capital company expects long-term
appreciation of the securities in which it invests. Once a venture
capital company becomes publicly held or reaches a certain 'size,
however, it becomes subject to detailed regulation under the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940.6 The venture capital industry has
consistently maintained that it cannot operate and function effi-
ciently under the strictures imposed by the 1940 Act 7 and the re-
sult has been the creation of few new publicly owned venture
capital firms and the lack of growth of those venture capital firms
already in existence.8 The ability of small, expanding firms to raise
investment capital has been steadily decreasing during the 1970's.9
initial investment through the public capital markets. VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 4, at 49.
Substantial profits have also been made recently as well. One venture capitalist has stated
that an initial investment of $178,000 in December 1977 resulted in a sale in February 1980
for $60 million. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1981, at D9, col. 2.
6. Ch. 686, tit. I, § 1, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a - 80a-52
(1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat.
2275 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a - 80a-64)) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Act].
7. Two of the largest venture capital firms in the United States-the Heizer Corporation
and the Naragansett Capital Corporation-have been at the forefront in trying to persuade
Congress to enact legislation that would ease the regulatory burdens imposed by the 1940
Act upon the venture capital industry. Venture Capital Improvements Acts of 1980: Hear-
ings on H.R. 7554 and H.R. 7491 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 167
(1980) (statement of Arthur D. Little) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Venture Capital Hearings];
Small Business Investment: Hearings on H.R. 10717, H.R. 13032, H.R. 13765, and identical
bills Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1978) (statement of E.F. Heizer,
Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Small Business Hearings].
8. Between 1969 and 1979, no new publicly owned venture capital companies came into
existence and the number of publicly owned venture capital companies that were created in
prior years diminished due to liquidation or acquisition. Small Business Investment Incen-
tive Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1979) (state-
ment of Russel Carson). A particular form of venture capital company is a small business
investment company-a privately owned, privately operated investment company licensed
by the Small Business Administration, which seeks to provide capital, long-term loans, and
managerial assistance to eligible small businesses. In 1963, there were 30 publicly owned
small business investment companies with total private capital of $350 million. As of June
1980, there were 14 publicly traded small business investment companies with only $90 mil-
lion of total private capital. 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 182. See also
Turner, SBICS, MESBICS and Conflicts of Interest, 36 FED. BAR. J. 185 (1977); Mendel-
sohn & Cerino, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Minority Enterprise Small
Business Investment Companies "Mesbics", 16 How. L. J. 744 (1971).
9. Several executive agencies and private organizations have performed studies directed
to the capital formation problems of small enterprises, and have concluded that risk capital
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This trend has impeded innovation and has gradually weakened
the economy."0
In order to help stimulate the growth and creation of the venture
capital industry and thus increase the flow of capital to small busi-
nesses, Congress has enacted the Small Business Investment In-
centive Act of 1980 ("1980 Act")." Part II of this Comment will
discuss the impact of the small business community upon the na-
tional economy and the method by which such small companies are
usually financed. Part III will examine the negative effects which
the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act") has had upon
venture capital companies in the form of a decrease in the flow of
capital to the small business community. The focal point of Part
III will be upon the application of section 1712 to venture capital
companies. Finally, Part IV will explore the basic framework un-
derlying the 1980 Act and how it attempts to alleviate the regula-
tory burdens under section 17 of the 1940 Act.
II. The Small Business Community
The importance of the small business community in the areas of
innovation, productivity,18 increased competition, and the jobs '
they create cannot be overstated. Extensive research by the Senate
in recent years has become extremely difficult to raise. See 126 CONG. REC. S13469 (daily ed.
Sept. 25, 1980). The most widely recognized of these studies is the one undertaken by the
Small Business Administration. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SBA Task Force on
Venture Capital for Small Business (Jan. 1977) (commonly referred to as the Casey Report,
after former SEC chairman William J. Casey). The report concluded that venture capitalists
have been avoiding young businesses, using their funds instead to take positions in estab-
lished companies. See also Small Business Access to Equity and Venture Capital: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities of the House
Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977) (statement of William J. Casey).
10. 126 CONG. REc., supra note 9, at S13469.
11. Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a - 80a-
64). The stated purpose of the 1980 Act is to facilitate the activities of business develop-
ment companies and to encourage the mobilization of capital for new, small and medium-
sized and independent businesses. S. REP. No. 958, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). See also
President's Statement on Signing H.R. 7554 into Law, 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2378
(Oct. 21, 1980).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1976).
13. The National Science Foundation reported that small firms (1000 employees or
fewer) incur one-fourth the cost per innovation of medium-sized firms (1000 to 10,000 em-
ployees) and one-twenty-fourth the cost of large firms (over 10,000 employees). 126 CoNG.
REc., supra note 9, at S13469-70.
14. See note 17 infra.
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Small Business Committee has established that new, small and in-
dependent firms have a pervasive, positive effect in their contribu-
tion to the economy.15 The Committee estimates that new and
small firms may account for as much as twenty to twenty-five per-
cent of actual economic growth." Other studies reveal that small
business is a significant factor in the maintenance and growth of
private sector employment. 17 The size of the enterprise gives rise
to advantages and disadvantages on either side of the spectrum.
One of the primary distinctions between large and small enter-
prises is the method by which each engages in capital formation.,
For established businesses, raising capital is accomplished by ei-
ther securing adequate bank financing or the issuance of stocks
and bonds to the public.'9 For small, developing companies, espe-
cially those engaged in the discovery of new technology and ser-
15. "Numerous studies establish that local businesses are a prime source of strength for
their neighborhoods and communities and are the repository of many of the most deeply
held American values, such as self-reliance, individuality, economic opportunity, hard work,
craftsmanship, and human scale." 126 CONG. REc., supra note 9, at S13470 (quoting from
Senate Small Business Comm. Print, Nov. 7, 1977).
16. Id. at S13469.
17. Fifty-two percent of new jobs generated between 1960 and 1976 were by independent
businesses with less than 20 employees. Id. at S13470. The Small Business Administration
reports that 55% of all existing jobs in the private sector are in small business. Id. The first
White House Conference on Small Business stated that new and existing small businesses in
recent years have provided 86.7% of new jobs in the private sector. 1980 White House Con-
ference Report, supra note 1, at 20. But see VENTURE CAPITAL, supra note 4, at 29, wherein
it is felt that empirical knowledge of the small business sector of the economy is seriously
incomplete.
18. Capital from outside sources is generally more difficult to obtain for small businesses
than for larger ones, yet small companies, particularly young and expanding ones, rarely
have sufficient earnings to support their growth. 1980 White House Conference Report,
supra note 1, at 61.
19. I.R.C. § 385 authorizes the Department of the Treasury to define corporate stock and
debt by regulations for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 385 lists certain
characteristics which may be taken into account in the regulations in determining whether
an instrument should be classified as debt or equity: (a) whether there is a written uncondi-
tional promise to pay on demand or on a specified maturity date a sum certain in money in
return for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of
interest, (b) whether there is subordination to or a preference over other debt, (c) the ratio
of debt to equity, (d) convertibility and (e) the relationship between stock and debt holdings
of the investor. See Thrower, Conglomerates-Some Tax Problems, 25 Bus. LAW. 641
(1970); N.Y. State Bar Association Tax Section Committee on Reorganization Problems,
Recommendations as to Federal Tax Distinction Between Corporate Stock and Indebted-
ness, 25 TAx LAW. 57 (1971). See also Jacobs, Small Business, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at
23, col. 1 (final tax rules on debt and equity).
1981] VENTURE CAPITAL 869
vices, access to such traditional capital markets is effectively
barred 20 because the risks associated with these companies may be
quite substantial. In response to this void in traditional capital
sources necessary to finance new enterprises, there has emerged a
new source of financing commonly referred to as venture capital,
which is the provision of equity and debt capital to young, small
firms by a class of entrepreneurs known as venture capital
companies.
Although the term "venture capital company" has never been
universally defined,"1 certain characteristics distinguish a venture
capital company from a traditional investment company. 22 A ven-
ture capital company furnishes capital directly to enterprises
which cannot obtain capital in public markets. The paucity of a
public market for the securities held by the venture capital com-
pany makes venture capital company investments illiquid and the
rate of portfolio turnover quite low.2 Furthermore, a venture capi-
tal company frequently enters into transactions with the investee
company and actively participates in the operations of the investee
company.24 Officers of the venture capital company often sit on the
20. Start-up capital for small entrepreneurs usually comes from the entrepreneur's sav-
ings and "sweat equity" or from friends and relatives. It is not until the company becomes
established before it may raise equity capital by selling shares through a public offering.
1980 White House Conference Report, supra note 1, at 62.
21. See notes 75-77 infra and accompanying text.
22. 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 55-56.
23. Basically, there are two reasons why venture capital companies must forego current
appreciation and instead seek long-term capital gains. First, new companies cannot generate
enough retained earnings to finance their growth but instead constantly require new injec-
tions of equity; therefore, such new companies cannot afford to pay out scarce equity in the
form of dividends. Second, the risks of investing in new companies are extremely high, and
consequently, investors demand a higher return on their investment. Such returns do not
come from dividends but from capital gains. 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at
257. The amount of long-term appreciation, however, can be quite formidable. According to
one of the most successful individual venture capitalists in the country, Frederick Adler, his
initial net worth of $50,000 in 1967 has now grown to over $100 million. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6,
1981, at D1, col. 4. The Narragansett Capital Corporation, note 7 supra, had over $9 million
of net income for the year ended Dec. 31, 1980. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1981, at D8, col. 8.
24. As important as capital is to developing companies, they often need assistance in
planning, financial analysis, and other aspects of business. The venture capital company,
unlike the passive institutional investor, is often the best source of guidance to a new firm.
126 CONG. REC., supra note 9, at S13459. In fact, the 1980 Act does provide that a business
development company must make available "significant managerial assistance" to compa-
nies which are treated by the business development company as satisfying the 70% of the
value of its total assets condition of new § 55. For a detailed discussion of exactly what
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board of directors of the investee company due to the large size of
the venture capital companies' capital investments and because the
personnel of the investee companies are typically entrepreneurs
unskilled in the essential phases of corporate management.
While venture capital companies are the primary source of capi-
tal for developing companies, the flow of capital funds has ebbed
in recent years.28 The statistics of the past several years establish
that small enterprises have encountered great difficulties in raising
venture and equity capital and at times virtually have been ex-
cluded from United States capital markets.2 6
The venture capital industry has stated that the reasons for the
shortage of capital are the inability of venture capital companies to
have public markets for their own equity securities without being
subject to detailed regulations under the 1940 Act 27 and the unwill-
ingness of venture capital businessmen to try and operate under
the 1940 Act as it existed.2 s Several hearings2 ' were held concern-
constitutes "significant managerial assistance," see notes 96-104 infra and accompanying
text.
25. See note 9 supra. A study conducted by the American Electronics Association re-
vealed that new and small firms founded between 1971 and 1975 were able to raise on the
average less than 30% as much capital as firms founded during 1966 and 1970 raised be-
tween 1966 and 1970. 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 255. Another item
demonstrating the general lack of capital availability is the dramatic decrease of capital
raised pursuant to registered stock issues over the past decade. In 1968 and 1969, 1,056
small companies were able to raise over $2 billion in equity capital from the public. In 1978
and 1979, only 79 small companies were able to go public for an amount totalling $400
million. 126 CONG. REc., supra note 9, at S13470.
26. BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 17, 1977, at 63, col. 1. Given the impact that small businesses
have on the economy, such a dearth of capital could eventually cause substantial damage to
economic growth. The Senate Small Business Committee did in fact conclude that the
problems of capital formation faced by new and small businesses during the 1970's are caus-
ing damage to the national economy. 126 CONG. REc., supra note 9, at S13469.
27. A thorough and complete description of the application of the 1940 Act to venture
capital companies and the general problems which venture capital companies felt existed
under the 1940 Act can be found in the statement of E.F. Heizer, Jr. (chairman and founder
of the Heizer Corp). See 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 49.
28. Id.
29. Small Business Investment Incentive Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Con-
sumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
96th Cong., 1st Seas. (1979); Small Business Investment: Hearings on H.R. 10717, H.R.
13032, H.R. 13765 and identical bills Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Seas.
(1978); H.R. 9549, The Capital, Investment and Business Opportunity Act: Hearings on
H.R. 9549 Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978).
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ing the relationship between venture capital financing and the
1940 Act, but there was no resulting legislation."s It was not until
the passage of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of
1980 that representatives of the venture capital industry and the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") finally were
able to agree upon legislation which incorporates appropriate relief
with the investor safeguards of the 1940 Act. 1
III. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 is a comprehensive fed-
eral regulatory scheme designed to protect shareholders of invest-
ment companies from a variety of improper practices that had be-
come widespread during the 1930's.3' The main abuses which
30. H.R. 3991, as reported in the Small Business Investment Incentive Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), was designed to amend § 3(c) of
the 1940 Act to totally exclude venture capital companies from the definition of an invest-
ment company. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") strongly opposed
this bill on the grounds that it would substantially reduce the protection afforded to both
unsophisticated and sophisticated investors. The Commission did concede that there did
exist a need to aid small businesses in raising capital, but felt that such a need should not
be accomplished by a dilution of investor protection. This view was reaffirmed by the Com-
mission in the 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 56.
The abuses which the Commission felt would arise if venture capital companies were ex-
cluded from the 1940 Act can be found in certain civil proceedings, all dealing with viola-
tions of section 17. Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470
F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972); Creative Capital Corp., (Investment Company Act Release No. 7791,
April 26, 1973); Illinois Capital Investment Cor., (SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 4699, 4777,
Oct. 9, 1970); Puerto Rico Capital Corp., (SEC Litigation Release No. 3308, Aug. 13, 1969).
But see 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 210, where, after an analysis of
these four civil proceedings, it was concluded that the Commission could instead protect
shareholders against overreaching and fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
irrespective of the 1940 Act.
This does not seem to represent such a great loss of shareholder protections, particu-
larly when weighed against the cost of compliance with the Investment Company Act
and its chilling effect on the development of new venture capital.
Id.
31. See Huffman, SEC Polishes Hill Image with Venture Capital Bills, Legal Times of
Wash., Aug. 18, 1980, at 4, col. 1 (political pressure played a role in finally forcing the Com-
mission to reach a compromise).
32. The 1940 Act originated in congressional concern that the Securities Act of 1933, ch.
38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III
1979)), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (currently
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), were inadequate to protect the
purchasers of investment company securities. The industry's problems had been thoroughly
explored and investigated in a four-year study conducted by the Commission as mandated
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developed in the investment company industry were abuses related
to the very nature of investment companies and their affiliations.33
One of the more egregious problems specifically identified was the
advantage the affiliated "insiders" had over the public investors . 4
In order to remedy this practice, section 17 of the 1940 Act was
drafted to prohibit sdcurities transactions between investment
companies and affiliated persons,85 except upon the granting of a
by Congress in section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, ch. 687, tit. I, § 30, 49
Stat. 837 (1935) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1976)). The SEC Report was issued
in four parts: THE NATURE, CLASSIFICATION AND ORIGIN OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R.
Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939); STATISTICAL SURVEY OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND
INVESTMENT COMPANIES, H.R. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); ABUSES AND DEFI-
CIENCIES IN THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COM-
PANIES, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940); CONTROL AND INFLUENCE OVER INDUS-
TRY AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 246, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., (1942). After Senate hearings,
the Commission and representatives of the investment industry agreed upon a compromise.
This compromise bill was unanimously approved and became the Investment Company Act
of 1940. For a greater discussion of the events leading to the enactment of the Act, and
about the Act generally, see Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.
L.Q. 303 (1941); Motley, Jackson, & Barnard, Federal Regulation of Investment Companies
Since 1940, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1134 (1950); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1941).
33. Since the assets of such companies are highly liquid and consist primarily of cash
and securities, there exist easy opportunities for embezzlement or theft.
Basically, the problems flow from the very nature of the assets of investment compa-
nies. The assets of such companies invariably consist of cash and securities, assets
which are completely liquid, mobile and readily negotiable. Because of these charac-
teristics, control of such funds offers manifold opportunities for exploitation by the
unscrupulous managements of some companies.
United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 108 n.14 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019
(1972). In addition to such insider self-dealing and manipulation, other widespread abuses
included pyramiding, looting, switching and dilution. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d
1315,. 1321 n.8 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
34. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 53 (1977).
35. 'Affiliated person' of another person means (A) any person directly or indirectly
owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the out-
standing voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more
of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or
held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other person; (D) any
officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such
other person is an investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any mem-
ber of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated
investment company not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1976). Section 17 has been construed to afford protection to the
stockholders of the affiliated persons as well. See Fifth Avenue Coach Lines Inc., 43 S.E.C.
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Commission s" exemption. While section 17 has been described by
the Commission as the "keystone" 7 of the 1940 Act, it is also that
section which has worked a particular hardship on the operations
of venture capital companies.
A. Section 17-Transactions of Certain Affiliated Per-
sons and Underwriters
Section 17 is intended to prevent abuses and unfair transactions
by insiders of investment companies"8 by requiring prior indepen-
635, 639 (1967).
36. The histories of the securities acts indicates that Congress intended to eliminate the
abuses which contributed to the stock market crash of 1929. Securities and Exchange
Comm'n v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The 1933 and 1934 Acts were
designed to assure that full disclosure would be made to prospective investors and purchas-
ers in order to provide for investor protection and thereby restore public confidence in the
securities industry. Comment, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judi-
cial Discretion, 10 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 328, 332-34 (1974). More specifically, the 1933
Act seeks to provide investors, through a registration process, with the information neces-
sary to make informed judgments as to new securities publicly offered and to prohibit
fraudulent and deceptive practices in the sale of securities. Id. at 329. The 1934 Act estab-
lishes the Commission to oversee the enforcement of the securities laws with broad, though
not unlimited, administrative powers to help extend maximum protection to the investing
public. Id. For a discussion of the remedial purposes of the securities acts, see generally 1 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1-158 (2d ed. 1961); 4 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATIONS
2201-94 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
37. In re National Ass'n of Small Bus. Inv. Cos., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 78,076 (1971).
38. The term "investment company," as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1976 & Supp. II
1978), means any issuer of securities which either engages primarily or proposes to engage
primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities, or which owns or
proposes to acquire investment securities, or which owns or proposes to acquire investment
securities whose value exceeds 40% of the value of the issuers total assets. Section 3(a) has
been criticized for being too broad, and thus including within its scope companies for which
the 1940 Act was not designed to regulate. For example, an industrial corporation that finds
itself with 40% or more of investment securities comes within the definition. See, e.g., At-
lantic Coast Line Co., 11 S.E.C. 661 (1942). See also Kerr & Appelbaum, Inadvertent In-
vestment Companies-Ten Years After, 25 Bus. LAW. 887, 905 (1970); Rosenblat & Ly-
becker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External Investment
Management Arrangements and the ALl Federal Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L.
REv. 587, 600-10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as External Investment Management]. Argu-
ments have been made by the National Association of Small Business Investment Compa-
nies that the 1940 Act was not intended to regulate small business investment companies,
however, such arguments have not been met with favor by the Commission. 1978 Small
Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 141, 187.
A "company" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) to mean a
"corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, a fund, or any
organized group of persons whether incorporated or not .. " A company need not be a
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dent scrutiny by the Commission of transactions between an in-
vestment company, its investment advisor,89 principal under-
writer, 0 or other "affiliated persons." Such transactions, which do
involve possible conflicts of interest, are governed by subsections
(a) 41 and (d).4 2 In brief, section 17 (a) generally prohibits any affili-
ated person (or any affiliated person of such an affiliated person)4"
"recognizable business entity." Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Securities and Exchange
Comm'n, 326 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). For a general discussion
of section 3(a), see Garrett, When is an Investment Company?, 37 U. DET. L.J. 355 (1960).
39. An "investment adviser," as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1976), means any
person who contracts with an investment company to provide to such company advice con-
cerning investing in, purchasing or selling securities or other property, or is empowered by
the investment company to determine what securities or other property shall be purchased
or sold. Investment advisers are governed by the Investment Advisers Act, ch. 686, 54 Stat.
847 (1940) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1976 & Supp. I 1978)). The Act
was enacted to prevent abuses of the fiduciary relationship between investment advisers and
their clients. See Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REv. 827
(1962).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(29) (1976).
41. It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person ... of a registered investment com-
pany . . . or any affiliated person of such a person . . . acting as principal-
(1) knowingly to sell any security or other property to such registered company or to
any company controlled by such registered company ....
(2) knowingly to purchase from such registered company, or from any company con-
trolled by such registered company, any security or other property (except securi-
ties of which the seller is the issuer); or
(3) to borrow money or other property from such registered company or from any
company controlled by such registered company (unless the borrower is con-
trolled by the lender) except as permitted in section 80a-21(b) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1976).
42. It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of. . .a registered investment com-
pany ...or any affiliated person of such a person ...acting as principal to effect
any transaction in which such registered company, or a company controlled by such
registered company, is a joint or a joint and several participant with such person...
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe for
the purpose of limiting or preventing participation by such registered or controlled
company on a basis different from or less advantageous than that of such other par-
ticipant ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1976).
43. An affiliated person of an affiliated person is commonly referred to as a "second-tier"
affiliate. See note 51 infra and accompanying text. The "second-tier" affiliate problem is
regarded as one of the more complex and troublesome areas of the 1940 Act. It has been
stated that
The problems that can arise under the [Investment Company] Act for such portfolio
affiliates or companies, which, in turn, are affiliated with them should be of interest
not only to 1940 Act buffs, but to any lawyer for an operating company the shares of
which are the object of the affections of any mutual fund. The topic also should ap-
peal to double-crostic fans.
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of a registered investment company knowingly from selling,
purchasing, or borrowing securities" or other property from the in-
vestment company; section 17(d) generally empowers the Commis-
sion to establish rules and procedures restricting any affiliated per-
son (or any affiliated person of such affiliated person) of a
registered investment company acting as principal from effecting
any transaction in which the investment company (or a company
controlled by the registered investment company) is a "joint or
joint and several"45 participant with the affiliated person.
1. Application of Section 17(a) to Venture Capital Companies
The affiliated persons of a venture capital company, as the term
is used in section 17(a), can be divided into two major groups:
1) "upstream" affiliates, who can control or can influence a venture
capital company, and 2) "downstream" affiliates, whom the ven-
ture capital company controls or can influence. The upstream affil-
iates of a venture capital company normally consist of its direc-
tors," officers and employees, and each stockholder of a venture
capital company owning five percent or more of its common
stock.47 The downstream affiliates"6 consist of all the companies of
External Investment Management, supra note 38, at 652 (quoting Kroll, The "Portfolio
Affiliate" Problem, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATIONS 261 (R. Mundheim
& A. Fleischer, Jr. eds. 1972)).
44. The definition of a "security" is found in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1976). This defi-
nition is identical'to the one used in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976). In
fact, the Commission has interpreted the two sections in a consistent manner. See, e.g.,
Moultrie Nat'l Bank, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,081 (1974);
Arthur E. Fox [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,082 (1974).
45. There is little authority construing the terms "joint or joint and several," see, e.g.,
Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir.
1972); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Talley Indus., -Inc., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied sub nom. General Tire Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 393 U.S.
1015 (1969); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Midwest Technical Dev. Corp., [1961-1964
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,252 (1963). Given the purpose of § 17, how-
ever, it is reasonable to conclude that § 17(d) not only encompasses the situation of a direct
transaction between the investment company and an affiliate, but also situations in which
the investment company and its affiliate agree to purchase or sell shares in another com-
pany. See Martin, Federal Regulation of Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Legislative Pro-
posal, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 316, 337 (1978).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(12) (1976).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A) (1976). See note 35 supra.
48. The problem of self-dealing by "downstream affiliates" was not addressed by either
the Commission or Congress during the 1940 hearings. External Investment Management,
supra note 38, at 653.
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which the venture capital company owns five percent or more of
the voting securities. 9
In addition to upstream and downstream affiliates, section 17(a)
also prohibits transactions between a venture capital company (or
the companies it controls) and affiliated persons of its affiliated
persons.60 This group, referred to as "second-tier" affiliated per-
sons, 51 consists mainly of persons who are related to each corporate
affiliated person of the venture capital company. 2 The very nature
of a venture capital company, unlike that of a traditional invest-
ment company, requires it to deal with its affiliated persons 53 on a
regular basis in the ordinary course of business. Consequently, vir-
tually every transaction64 of a venture capital company runs the
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(B) (1976). See note 35 supra.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1976).
51. For a good description of the "second-tier" affiliate problem, see External Invest-
ment Management, supra note 38, at 651-54.
52. Included in the second-tier are: 1) each director of each corporate affiliated person of
the venture capital company, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (1976), 2) each officer or employee
of each corporate affiliated person of the venture capital company, id., 3) each person own-
ing five percent or more of the voting securities of each corporate affiliated person of the
venture capital company, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A) (1976), and 4) each company, five per-
cent or more of whose securities are owned by such corporate affiliated persons of the ven-
ture capital company, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(B) (1976). Also within the second-tier is each
partner or employee of each natural affiliated person of the venture capital company, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (1976) and each company five percent or more of whose voting se-
curities are owned by each natural affiliated person of the venture capital company, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(B) (1976) ("person" means a natural person, or a company, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-2(a)(28) (1976)).
53. 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 81.
54. The following representative examples demonstrate the restraints placed upon ven-
ture capital companies by § 17(a):
(1) Assume a bank owns five percent or more of the voting securities of a venture capital
company, thereby qualifying as an upstream affiliate of the venture capital company. Sec-
tion 17(a) not only bars the bank from dealing with the venture capital company, but also
bars the affiliated persons of the bank (the second-tier affiliates) from dealing with the ven-
ture capital company. This group includes all of the directors, officers and employees of the
bank, and all the companies of which the bank owns five percent or more of the outstanding
voting securities. It is likely that a bank, through trust accounts and other methods, holds
the power to vote five percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of numerous,
small developing companies. If, in an independent business judgment, the venture capital
company decides to invest capital in one of these small companies whose stock is held by
the bank, then § 17(a) is violated and the transaction can be held void in accordance with 15
U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1976). 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 82.
(2) Assume that a venture capital company owns a controlling interest of a small, develop-
ing company and that one of the venture capital companies' investors is an insurance com-
pany that owns five percent or more of the venture capital companies' securities. If an em-
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risk of being in violation of section 17(a),55 thereby causing hesita-
tion on the part of venture capital companies prior to entering into
those transactions which may be necessary for the continued exis-
tence of the investee company.
2. The Application of Section 17(d) to Venture Capital
Companies
Section 17(d)5 makes it unlawful for any affiliated person of an
investment company or any affiliated person of such person, to ef-
fect any transaction in which the investment company is a "joint
or joint and several" participant5 7 with such affiliated person
without first obtaining the approval of the Commission. Just as in
section 17(a), section 17(d) seeks to protect investment companies
and their shareholders from overreaching and self-dealing by affili-
ated persons."8 The basic difference is that while section 17(a) is
concerned with unfairness and overreaching in transactions in
ployee of the insurance company buys a used desk from the developing company, then this
purchase can be void under § 17(a). It is worth recognizing that there is virtually no reason-
able way for the employee, the insurance company, or the venture capital company to recog-
nize the illegality of the transaction. (A presumption of control arises where one, whether
directly or indirectly, owns 25% or more of another's outstanding voting securities. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1976)). 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 83.
55. The Commission has attempted to extend relief to venture capital companies and
small investment companies through Rule 17a-6. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-6 (1980). Venture
capital firms, however, have stated that the Rule is so vague and complex that such relief is
meaningless. 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 165; 1978 Small Business
Hearings, supra note 7, at 79. For example, a vital element for an exemption under Rule
17a-6 is the term "direct or indirect financial interest." 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-6(a)(5)(ii)
(1980). Yet this term is not defined in the rule or the 1940 Act; rather, the Rule only lists a
few situations which the Commission deems to be excluded from the meaning of the term
"financial interest." There is no "de minimis" standard or any other type of practical limita-
tion to help venture capital companies determine what is meant by "financial interest." It is
not unusual, therefore, for venture capital companies to hesitate entering into transactions
which may be violative of § 17, because under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1976), every contract
made in violation of the 1940 Act would be void. The 1980 Act now would save such a
contract if a court finds that enforcement 1) would produce a more equitable result than
nonenforcement and 2) would not be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. 1980 Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2277 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (1976) (for the precise language of § 17(d) see note 42 supra).
Draftsmen for the proposed Federal Securities Code have stated that § 17(d) is perhaps the
most troublesome provision in the entire Act. 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7,
at 86 n.46.
57. See note 45 supra.
58. For the legislative history and purpose of § 17(d), see External Investment Manage-
ment, supra note 38, at 643-44 n.178.
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which the investment company and its affiliates are on opposite
sides of the bargaining table, section 17(d) is intended to regulate
the situation where the investment company and its affiliates are
united in interest. One of the more important features of this sub-
section is that for conduct to be unlawful under section 17(d), it
must be in contravention of some rule or regulation of the Com-
mission issued under the authority of section 17(d). The Commis-
sion has responded by promulgating Rule 17d-1. 5e Just as under
section 17(a), section 17(d) and Rule 17d-1 also create potential
difficulties for venture capital companies.6 0
59. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1980). Rule 17d-l(a) prohibits, without prior Commission ap-
proval, joint enterprises between a venture capital company (or one of its controlled compa-
nies) and any affiliated person, any underwriter and any affiliated person of such an affili-
ated person or underwriter. (17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(c) (1980), defines joint enterprises as
"any written or oral plan, contract, authorization or arrangement, or any practice or under-
standing concerning an enterprise or undertaking.").
17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(b) (1980) provides that in passing judgment upon an application for
an application for an exemption the Commission is to consider whether the investment com-
panies' participation in the transaction is consistent with the purpose of the 1940 Act, and
the extent to which such participation is on a basis different from or less advantageous than
that of other participants. For examples of the types of transactions held to be within §
17(d) and Rule 17d-1, see 4 FED. SEc. L. Ra. (CCH) 48,399.
An exemption to the prohibitions in Rule 17d-1 has been established in Rule 17d-l(d)(5).
This rule permits joint transactions, without Commission approval, between an investment
company and an affiliate of the investment company where certain key persons of the in-
vestment company do not have a "financial interest" in the joint transaction, and neither
the investment company nor a controlled company commits greater than five percent of its
assets to the joint transaction. Because the substance of this rule is very similar to that of
Rule 17a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-6 (1980), any difficulties which arise are also very similar.
For the problems encountered in Rule 17a-6, see note 55 supra. Hence, Rule 17d-l(d)(5)
does not present substantial relief to venture capital companies.
60. The following examples are illustrative of some typical venture capital company
problems that may arise pursuant to § 17(d) and Rule 17d-1:
(1) If a venture capital company decides to implement a pension plan in order to attract
qualified personnel, such a pension plan is a joint enterprise under Rule 17d-1(d)(5), 17
C.F.R. 270.17d-1(d)(5) (1980), and is not allowed because the employees have an obvious
"financial interest" in the transaction. Thus, unlike most other businesses, a venture capital
company needs Commission approval before it may establish a pension plan. 1978 Small
Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 89.
(2) Assume that a venture capital company owns five percent of the voting securities of a
new, developing company (company X) and that such company is seeking to make a public
offering of its securities. At the time the venture capital company acquired the stock of
company X, it contracted with the company to allow the venture capital company to sell its
company X shares as part of the same registration statement that company X may eventu-
ally use for a public offering. Now suppose that the venture capital company is also offering
its own shares to the public and that an investment banking firm is a member of the under-
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B. Exemption Procedures From the 1940 Act
1. Section 17(b)- Transaction Exemptions
Notwithstanding the barring of a transaction by sections 17(a)
and (d), it is possible to obtain an order from the Commission ex-
empting the transaction from the applicable prohibitions. Section
17(b)" provides the mechanism by which, upon application, the
Commission may exempt any proposed transaction if: 1) the evi-
dence establishes that the terms of the proposed transaction are
reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching, 2) the pro-
posed transaction is consistent with the policy of each investment
company involved; and, 3) the proposed transaction is consistent
with the general purpose of the 1940 Act. 2 While section 17(b)
may be efficient for investment companies such as mutual funds, it
is too restrictive,"3 too time-consuming '4 and too costly 65 to be of
writing syndicate for both the venture capital company and for company X. Under these
circumstances, the venture capital company cannot exercise its contract to sell its company
X shares without first obtaining prior Commission approval. This is necessary because the
investment banker is deemed to have a financial interest in the company X offering and
such an interest violates Rule 17d-l(d)(5). Waiting for such Commission approval may very
well jeopardize the company X offering and thereby create a disadvantage to the venture
capital companies' shareholders in that they are forced to keep the shares of company X
beyond that which they desire. Id. at 88.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b) (1976).
62. For a representative sampling of those transactions granted a section 17(b) exemp-
tion, see 4 FED. SEc. L. R",. (CCH) 48,374.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (1976) grants the Commission authority to issue rules and regula-
tions necessary or appropriate for the Commission to exercise its power under the 1940 Act.
Consequently, the Commission has promulgated rules concerning the procedures to be fol-
lowed in requesting a hearing or review. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-201.28 (1980). As a practical
matter, exemption proceedings under section 17(b) require a minimum of sixty days. See
1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 92. See also External Investment Manage-
ment, supra note 38, at 639 (Section 17(b) is a cumbersome application procedure and often
prevents timely execution of the proposed transaction).
64. The inordinate amount of time necessary to obtain a § 17(b) exemption is best illus-
trated in Grace v. Ludwig, 484 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1973). In Grace, an exemption order was
initially filed on July 31, 1967. On Oct. 25, 1967 the Commission directed hearings to take
place and such hearings were conducted from Jan. 4, 1968 to June 7, 1968. Seventeen wit-
nesses testified, resulting in a 7500 page transcript. The parties then waived an initial deci-
sion by the hearing examiner and opted for a full hearing before the Commission, which was
held on Nov. 12, 1968. See also Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972) (an applica-
tion for a § 17(b) exemption was filed in Jan. 1953 and the exemption was not granted until
Nov. 1953); cf. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977) (a delay caused while waiting for Commission approval of a merger resulted in
further stock speculation which was damaging to the parties).
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any practical value to a venture capital company.
2. Section 3(c)(1)-Exemption from the 1940 Act
It is possible for a venture capital company to exist without hav-
ing to comply with the 1940 Act so long as it initially and continu-
ally complies with the following conditions for exemption as found
in section 3(c)(1):66 1) the funds necessary to finance the venture
capital business must be obtained from 100 or fewer investors;
2) an investment company owning more than ten percent of a ven-
ture capital companies' voting securities 67 may not devote more
than ten percent of its assets to investment in the venture capital
company without having its own shareholders or partners treated
as owners of the venture capital companies' securities for purposes
of the 100 or fewer beneficial investors limitation; and 3) the ven-
ture capital companies' stock offering must qualify as private
under the Securities Act of 1933.68
The Commission's determination under § 17(b) does not preclude a court from examining
the fairness of such a decision. Harriman v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp.
133 (D. Del. 1975). In reviewing a decision of the Commission, a court must consider both
the facts and the application of the relevant statute by the agency. Congress has mandated
that in review of § 17 proceedings, "[t]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42(a) (1976). A re-
viewing court is also to be guided by the "venerable principle that the construction of the
statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong. . . ." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432
U.S. 46 (1977), in which the Court held that the lower court erred in rejecting the Commis-
sion's conclusion and substituting its own judgment. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do
not ordinarly apply to decisions of administrative tribunals. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 202 F.2d 190, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1952), afl'd, 347 U.S. 239 (1954). As
applied to the Commission, see Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
65. 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 93. An official of the National Asso-
ciation of Small Business Investment Companies has stated that due to the length of time
required to obtain a § 17(b) exemption, many transactions have been avoided to the eco-
nomic detriment of the companies involved and their shareholders. Id. at 234 (statement of
Peter van Oosterhout). See also 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 173-74.
(the legal costs alone of obtaining two transaction exemptions were $20,000 and $29,000,
respectively) (statement of Arthur D. Little).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (1976), as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
477, § 102, 94 Stat. 2276. Section 3(c)(1) deals with an exemption from the entire 1940 Act,
while § 17(b), see notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text, provides an exemption only for
the particular transaction under review.
67. "Voting security" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(42) (1976) as any security enti-
tling the owner or holder to vote in the election of directors of the company.
68. Section 4(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d
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Section 3(c)(1) was amended by the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act of 1980 in response to the problem that privately-
held investment companies, including venture capital companies,
had faced in attracting substantial amounts of capital from institu-
tional investors and other entities without exceeding the 100-inves-
tor limit for exclusion from the 1940 Act.69 Prior to the revision of
section 3(c)(1), 7 0 once a company owned ten percent or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the issuing company, beneficial
ownership was deemed to have occurred, regardless of the percent-
age of assets devoted to the investment. The change of section
3(c)(1) is a general revision applying to all investment companies,
not just venture capital companies, and is a clear step in stimulat-
ing larger amounts of new capital investments.
Even with the revision of section 3(c)(1), however, a dilemma
still exists for venture capital companies attempting to remain
outside the 1940 Act. Investors in venture capital companies ex-
pect that their investments must be held for a period of years
before significant capital appreciation is likely to occur.7 1 Realiza-
tion of these gains to the investor from the venture capital com-
pany is normally achieved through two alternatives. The venture
capital company can in some fashion liquidate, whereupon portfo-
(1976)), grants an exemption from certain provisions of the 1933 Act for those transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering. In Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), the Court first acknowledged that "[t]he Securities Act
nowhere defines the scope of § 4[21's private offering exemption," id. at 122, and then inter-
preted the exemption in light of the basic legislative purpose of the 1933 Act. "[Tihe appli-
cability of § 4[2] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the
protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves
is a transaction 'not involving any public offering.'" Id. at 125. Under the guidelines estab-
lished in Ralston Purina, lower courts have recognized that a primary factor in obtaining a
private offering exemption is to be the knowledge of the offerees; that is, whether the offer-
ees have access to the kind of information that a registration statement would disclose. Se-
curities & Exchange Comm'n v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3493 (Jan. 12, 1981); General Life of Missouri Inv. Co. v.
Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774, 781 (8th Cir. 1976); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d
893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977). Exemptions from the 1933 Act are construed narrowly and the
burden of proof is on the person who claims such an exemption. Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 280 (9th Cir. 1979); Securities and Exchange Comm'n
v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960, 968 (9th Cir. 1979).
69. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 8453.
70. 1940 Act, ch. 686 § 3, 54 Stat. 797 (1940) (current version at 94 Stat. 2276).
71. See note 23 supra.
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lio values are transferred directly to the investor, or it can create a
public market for its securities. Any attempt at going public would
require the venture capital company to register under the 1940
Act. Obviously, it would be more beneficial to both the investor
and the public for the venture capital company to choose to regis-
ter under the 1940 Act rather than to choose to liquidate. Virtually
every venture capital company, however, chooses not to subject it-
self voluntarily to the provisions of the 1940 Act.7
IV. The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of
1980
An attempt to alleviate the problems encountered by venture
capital companies under section 17 has been made in the Small
Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980.7 As stated in the Sen-
ate Report on the 1980 Act, one of the primary purposes of the Act
is to "[p]ermit business development companies to raise funds
from both public and private sources and remove unnecessary stat-
utory impediments to their entrepreneurial activities consistent
with investor safeguards. 14 Given that the 1980 Act refers specifi-
cally to "business development companies" and not venture capital
companies, it is necessary to determine if there are any differences
between a venture capital and a business development company,
72. See note 8 supra. For example, one of the nation's most prominent venture capital
companies, American Research and Development Corporation, had to merge with another
corporation in 1972 rather than trying to continue to operate under the 1940 Act. "I had to
terminate [American Research and Development Corporation] because it could not exist
under the '40 Act. That is the sole reason it does not exist today as an independent com-
pany." 1978 Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 58 n.12 (interview of General
Georges F. Doriot by Paul H. Dykstra on Nov. 9, 1978).
73. The 1980 Act amends the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (currently
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. II
1978)), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (currently codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)), and the 1940 Act. The two areas of
most particular concern are the 1940 Act and the Securities Act of 1933. The amendments
dealing with the 1933 Act are designed to help alleviate the costs to small businesses in
registering and complying with the 1933 Act. It is generally believed that compliance costs
are felt more heavily by small businesses and this may deter such small businesses from
entering the capital market. See BuSINsas WEK, June 16, 1980, at 159, col. 1. Other efforts
have also recently been made by the Commission to help reduce regulatory burdens on
small enterprises. See H.R. REP. No. 1341, supra note 69, at 20, for a detailed description of
such Commmission efforts.
74. S. REP. No. 958, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 3 (1980).
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and to determine exactly what constitutes a business development
company.
A. Business Development Companies
One of the original versions of the 1980 Act did attempt to de-
fine the precise meaning of a venture capital company.75 The 1980
Act substituted for "venture capital company" the term "business
development company. 76 Representatives of the venture capital
industry have indicated that the definition of a business develop-
ment company does encompass most venture capital companies. 77
For purposes of the 1980 Act, the two terms can be used
interchangeably.
A business development company is defined in section 2(a)(48) 78
as any closed-end 7e domestic company that is operated for the pur-
pose of investing in securities of the companies indicated in section
5580 and that makes available to these companies significant mana-
75. 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 23-25. The Commissioner of the
SEC stated that the definition drafted in proposed H.R. 7554 of a venture capital company
is, one of the better definitions that he has seen, but that
it is really not in the interests of the venture capital community to try and define
them because the SEC, through its inspection program, would then have to be in a
position of trying to assess for example whether or not a given investment is a turn-
around or a leveraged buy-out or whether a company is in a development stage or in
need of reorganization.
Id. at 69.
76. The reason given for the change was that Congress felt that the term "venture capi-
tel company" has different connotations to different persons and may thus lead to eventual
difficulties. H.R. REP. No. 1341, supra note 69, at 34, -U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 8460;
S. REP. No. 958, supra note 74, at 19.
77. H.R. REP. No. 1341, supra note 69, at 34, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 8460. But
see 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 121, wherein a member of the National
Venture Capital Association stated that the definition of "business development company"
is too restrictive and would hinder, rather than facilitate, the flow of needed capital to new
and developing companies (statement of Mr. Hagopian).
78. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2276 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(48)).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (1976) defines a closed-end company to be any management com-
pany other than an open-end company. An open-end company, commonly called a mutual
fund, continually engages in the issuance of its shares and stands ready at any time to re-
deem them; a closed-end company typically does not issue shares after its initial offering
except at infrequent intervals, and does not stand ready to redeem them. Investment Co.
Inst. v. Board of Governors, 606 F.2d 1004, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
80. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2278 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-54).
A detailed analysis of § 55 is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an insightful descrip-
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gerial assistance."' Section 55 is designed to impose investment re-
strictions on business development companies in order to ensure
that companies claiming "business development company" status
are actually providing capital and managerial assistance to small,
developing companies rather than investing in large, well-estab-
lished businesses. Under the 1980 Act, business development com-
panies must invest in eligible portfolio companies and make availa-
ble significant managerial assistance.
1. Eligible Portfolio Companies
Essentially, section 55 requires seventy percent s2 of the value of
the business development companies' investment assets to be com-
posed of securities purchased in nonpublic transactions from "eli-
gible portfolio companies" or their affiliates,83 securities of "eligible
portfolio companies" initially controlled by the business develop-
ment company,8 4 and United States Government securities and
high quality debt securities with a maturity of less than one year.85
"Eligible portfolio companies," as defined in section 2(a)(46), 86
are generally those small, developing companies which are in need
of capital financing but are locked out of the conventional capital
tion of the application and structure of § 55, see H.R. REP. No. 1341, supra note 69, at 38-
44, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 8464-8470.
81. See notes 96-104 infra and accompanying text.
82. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2278 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
54(a)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 94 Stat. 2279 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-54(a)(2)).
85. Id. at 94 Stat. 2280 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-54(a)(6)). The venture capital
industry has criticized new § 54(a)(6) for failing to take into consideration a venture capital
companies' need to meet current operating expenses because the companies in which ven-
ture capital companies invest do not pay out current dividends, see note 23 supra, forcing
the venture capital companies to make other investments that will provide operating funds.
The investments described in new § 55(a)(6), while they are safe and liquid, generally pro-
duce the lowest rate of return. See 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra note 7, at 158
(statement of Arthur D. Little).
86. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(46)). An eligible portfolio company must be a domestic company, and, with one excep-
tion, it cannot be an investment company or a company which would be an investment
company absent the § 3(c)(1) exemption. (The exception, as found in new § 2(a)(46)(B), id.,
allows an eligible portfolio company to be a small business investment company licensed by
the Small Business Administration and which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the business
development company). The purpose of this restriction seems to be to require business de-
velopment companies to invest in operating companies rather than in financial institutions.
Hence, a bank or insurance company could not be an eligible portfolio company.
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markets. The pool of eligible portfolio companies is very broad 7
and consists of three basic categories.88 First, an eligible portfolio
company may not have securities outstanding which are eligible for
margin purchase under Federal Reserve Board regulations.89 The
underlying rationale is that companies eligible for margin purchase
generally have ready access to the public capital markets and con-
ventional sources of financing. The second category consists of
companies which are controlled by the business development com-
pany, regardless of the eligibility under margin purchase regula-
tions.90 This category is designed to cover corporations which are
in need of capital, but because of their current financial position
may be precluded from conventional financing methods. Finally,
the third category"1 consists of companies which the 'Commission
may establish by rule "as consistent with the public interest, the
protection of investors, and the purposes fairly intended by the
policies and provisions of [the Act]." ' If it is found that the pre-
scribed requirements of an eligible portfolio company have been
too narrowly defined, thereby restricting the flow of capital and the
intent of the 1980 Act, the Commission may broaden the category
of eligible portfolio companies.' 8
2. Managerial Assistance
Once a business development company has invested in a com-
pany properly defined as an eligible portfolio company, it must
87. It is estimated that there are presently 12,000 publicly-held operating companies and
that the definition of "eligible portfolio company" would cover approximately two-thirds, or
8000 of these companies, plus all private companies. 1980 Venture Capital Hearings, supra
note 7, at 66.
88. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(46)(C)).
89. Id. at 94 Stat. 2275 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(46)(C)(i)). In accordance
with present regulations, this includes exchange-listed securities and over-the-counter secur-
ities which meet certain conditions. See H.R. REP. No. 1341, supra note 69, at 30 n.1, U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 8456.
90. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(46)(C)(ii)).
91. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(46)(C)(iii)).
92. Id.
93. Objective factors to be considered by the Commission in broadening the class of eli-
gible portfolio companies are the size of such companies, the extent of their public owner-
ship; and their operating history as going-concerns and public companies. H.R. REP. No.
1341, supra note 69, at 31, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 8457.
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also "make available significant managerial assistance.' A busi-
ness development company is operated not for current yield but
for long-term appreciation;" 5 hence, it is in the best interests of the
business development company to provide guidance and counsel to
the investee company and to help the investee company establish
objectives, policies and corporate strategy.
Managerial assistance, as defined in section 2(a)(47),9 is com-
prised of two basic activities.97 First, the term includes "any ar-
rangement whereby a business development company, through its
directors, officers, employees, or general partners, offers to provide,
and if accepted, does so provide, significant guidance and counsel
concerning the management, operations, or business objectives and
policies of & portfolio company."" s This requires the business de-
velopment company to have at its disposal the skills and talents
necessary to provide significant managerial assistance when such
assistance is requested by the eligible portfolio company."e The
business development company need only offer to provide such as-
sistance; if the eligible portfolio company refuses an offer made by
the business development company in good faith, there is no viola-
tion of section 2(a)(47). 100
Second, managerial assistance is provided when a business devel-
opment company exercises "a controlling influence over the man-
agement or policies of a portfolio company. . acting individually
94. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2276 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(48)).
95. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
96. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2275-76 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(47)).
97. A third activity involves the making of loans to an eligible portfolio company by a
small business investment company licensed under the Small Business Investment Act of
1958. Id.
98. Id.
99. The investors relationship with the eligible portfolio company after making the in-
vestment normally requires the investor to significantly involve itself with the operations of
the investee company. Careful thought must be given to such questions as to what both the
investor and the eligible portfolio company seek to accomplish from their relationship. Also,
the investor must be willing to act quickly and to implement a specific course of action
when the eligible portfolio company encounters any difficulties. See generally Collins &
Ruhm, The Legal and Business Aspects of Venture Capital Investing 213 (Practising Law
Inst. Pub. No. 208, 1979).
100. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2275-76 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(47)).
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or as part of a group acting together which controls such portfolio
company."' ' If the sole manner in which a business development
company provides managerial assistance is by being part of a
group in which one of the persons in the group makes assistance
available, then the business development company would not be
deemed to be making available significant managerial assistance.10 2
The precise nature of the managerial assistance provided may
take several forms. A business development company may help in
finding and selecting for the portfolio company members of the
board of directors08 and key management personnel. Also, a busi-
ness development company may help establish ties between the
portfolio company and commercial and investment bankers.10'
B. Section 57-Transactions with Certain Affiliates
Once a venture capital company elects business development
company status, newly enacted section 6(f) 05 provides a general
exemption'0 1 from sections one through fifty-three of the 1940 Act.
In place of these sections, the 1980 Act has created a revised regu-
latory structure.07 Because the major hardships complained of by
venture capital companies have been the restrictions under section
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. In all likelihood, a business development company would try to have one of its own
officers, directors, or employees elected to the portfolio companies' board of directors in
order to take an active role in management. S. REP. No. 958, supra note 74, at 17-18.
104. Practically speaking, the nature and amount of managerial assistance provided un-
doubtedly will vary in accordance with the growth of the portfolio company. Assistance pro-
vided to a recently established portfolio company should be greater than in later years as
the portfolio company begins to make independent decisions concerning its operations. H.R.
REP. No. 1341, supra note 69, at 33, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 8459.
105. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 103, 94 Stat. 2277 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
6(f)).
106. In order to qualify for the exemption, a company has to elect to be treated as a
business development company pursuant to new § 54 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-53),
or if the company could be exempt from the term "investment company" as provided in §
3(c)(1) except that it currently proposes to make a public offering of its securities as a busi-
ness development company, notify the Commission that it intends in good faith to file
within 90 days a notification of election to become subject to the provisions of §§ 55-71 of
the 1980 Act.
107. Notwithstanding the general exemption provided in § 6(f), new § 59 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-58) applies certain sections of the 1940 Act to business development
companies. The applicable sections still in effect are: §§ 1-5, 6, 9, 10(f), 15(a), (c) & (f),
16(b), 17(f)-(j), 19(a), 20(b), 32(a)(i), 33-47, and 49-53.
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17, the 1980 Act has attempted to lessen the effect of section 17 as
it applies to venture capital companies. Newly enacted section
57108 now provides special procedures designed to facilitate various
types of beneficial dealings between business development compa-
nies and their affiliates.
Under sections 57(a) and (d), there are still four types of trans-
actions which certain affiliated persons related to the business de-
velopment company (and certain affiliated persons of tl'ese per-
sons) may not enter into with the business development company
without prior approval, either from the Commission or from a "re-
quired majority" 109 of directors of the business development com-
pany. The prohibited transactions in sections 57(a) and (d) are
identical-the sections differ only as to whom they are applied to
and as to how exemptions may be obtained.
1. Section 57 Prohibited Transactions
First, an affiliated person cannot knowingly sell any security or
other property to the business development company (or a com-
pany controlled by the business development company) unless the
business development company is the issuer of the security or un-
less the affiliated person is the issuer and the security is part of a
general offering to the holders of a class of its securities. 110 Second,
an affiliated person cannot knowingly purchase from the business
development company (or from a company controlled by the busi-
ness development company) any security or other property except
securities issued by the business development company.1  Third,
an affiliate cannot knowingly borrow money or other property from
108. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2278 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56)).
109. A "required majority" means both a majority of a business development companies'
directors or general partners who have no financial interest in the transaction, and a major-
ity of such directors or general partners who are not interested persons of such companies.
Id. at 94 Stat. 2285 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(o)). The term "interested person,"
as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1976), is very broad and intricate. An "interested
person" of an investment company would include an affiliated person. Id. For the legislative
history of "interested persons," see North, The Investment Company Amendment Act of
1970, 46 NoTma DAmE LAW. 712, 718-20 (1971).
110. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2280 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(a)(1), (d)(1)).
111. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(a)(2), (d)(2)).
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the business development company'1 1 (or a company controlled by
the business development company), except as permitted in sec-
tion 21(b) 13 or in section 62,114 or unless the affiliated person is
controlled by the business development company. Fourth, certain
affiliates 1 " cannot knowingly effect any joint transaction with the
business development company in contravention of Commission
rules.116
The transactions prohibited in sections 57(a) and (d) are quite
similar to the transactions prohibited in sections 17(a) and (d).
The only major difference is that acts done without scienter 17
have been excluded from those transactions prohibited by sections
57(a) and (d).
2. Application of Section 57(a)
Section 57(a) is intended to apply to those affiliates, as enumer-
ated in section 57(b),118 who are controlling persons of the business
development company or who are very closely affiliated persons of
the business development company. Section 57(b)(1) includes any
director, officer, employee and member of an advisory board of the
business development company and any person who either directly
112. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(a)(3), (d)(3)).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-21(b) (1976). Section 21(b) permits the extension or renewal of any
loan made prior to March 15, 1940, and also permits an investment company to make a loan
to a company which owns all of the outstanding securities of the investment company.
114. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2287 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
61). Section 62 applies § 21 to business development companies along with some additional
provisions which are designed to enable business development companies to attract and re-
tain key officers and employees by offering an executive compensation plan.
115. This encompasses the affiliates described in § 57(b), see note 122 infra and accom-
panying text, and the affiliates described in § 57(e), see note 128 infra and accompanying
text.
116. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2280 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8a-
56(a)(4), (d)(4)).
117. Scienter or recklessness, in the case of a failure to disclose, requires that "the dan-
ger of misleading buyers must be actually known or so obvious that any reasonable man
would be legally bound as knowing." Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (citing Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev.
Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated, 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980)
(insufficient time allowed by trial court to permit plaintiff to conduct adequate discovery).
"[A] director may have an obligation to maintain an awareness of significant corporate de-
velopments and to consider any material, adverse developments which come to his atten-
tion." Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973).
118. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2281 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(b)).
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or indirectly is controlled by or is under common control with any
of these persons. Section 57(b)(2) includes any investment adviser
or promoter of, general partner in, and principal underwriter for
the business development company or any person who controls, is
controlled by, or who is under common control with any of these
persons. Section 57(b)(2) also includes officers, directors, partners
or employees of, and persons controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with these affiliates.
Sections 57(a) and (b) regulate the conflict of interests
problems119 that arise in "upstream" 120 affiliate transactions. As
such, the 1980 Act still requires that Commission review and ap-
proval of the transaction first be obtained." The findings required
to be made by the Commission are substantially similar to those
required in section 17(b).122 Consequently, venture capital compa-
nies are still faced, at least with respect to "upstream" transac-
tions, with a time-consuming and costly exemption procedurel'2
when the very nature of their operations requires current decisions
and financing.
3. Application of Section 57(d)
Newly enacted section 57(d)1"4 applies to transactions between
the business development company and certain affiliated persons
who are described in new section 57(e)1" and who are not subject
to the prohibitions of section 57(a).
Section 57(e)(1) includes certain affiliated persons who are non-
controlling shareholders of the business development company.126
119. See note 54, 60 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 46.
121. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2281 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(c)).
122. There are three evidentiary factors to be considered by the Commission in ruling
upon an exemption order: 1) the terms of the proposed transaction must be reasonable and
fair and not involve overreaching, 2) the proposed transaction must be consistent with the
policy of each registered investment company (or business development company) and 3)
the proposed transaction must be consistent with the general purposes of the 1940 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-17(b) (1971); Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2281 (1980) (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(c)).
123. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
124. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2281 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(d)).
125. Id. at 94 Stat. 2282 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(e)).
126. This group is comprised of persons affiliated with the business development com-
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Section 57(e)(1) also encompasses directors or executive officers1 7
of, or general partners in, such five percent shareholder affiliates
and persons directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with such five percent shareholder affiliates.
Section 57(e)(2) prohibits transactions between a business devel-
opment company and any person who is an affiliated person of a
director, officer, employee, investment adviser, member of an advi-
sory board or promoter of, principal underwriter for, general part-
ner in, or an affiliated person of any person directly or indirectly
controlling or under common control with a business development
company. This would not include, however, the business develop-
ment company itself or affiliates of a person who is under common
control with the business development company solely by reason of
being directly or indirectly controlled by the business development
company."2 8
The main distinction between sections 57(d) and (e) and other
predecessor sections is that there is no need for Commission ap-
proval for an exemption; rather, section 57(f) 2 requires that ap-
proval of a transaction otherwise prohibited under section 57(d) be
made by a "required majority" 80 of the directors or general part-
ners of the business development company. The standards of re-
view in section 57(f) are similar to those applied by the Commis-
sion in section 57(c)-fairness of the terms of the transaction and
consistency with a business development company's policies.' 3 '
pany solely because they directly or indirectly own, control, or hold, with the power to vote
five percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the business development com-
pany, but who do not directly or indirectly control the business development company. Id.
127. Executive officers, as used in § 57(e), Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2282 (1980)
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(e)), means "the president, secretary, treasurer, and any
vice president in charge of a principal business function, and any other person who performs
similar policymaking functions." Id.
128. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2282 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(e)(2)).
129. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2282 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(0).
130. See note 109 supra.
131. The House Committee has stated that it expects the Commission to carefully moni-
tor directorial review and, if it is apparent that § 57(f) is not properly functioning, so as to
impair investor protection, then the Committee would take action to reinstate procedures
necessary for investor protection. H.R. REP. No. 1341, supra note 69, at 48, U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 8474.
The utilization of directorial review in the promulgation of management policies and ac-
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The reason for the substitution of director or general partner re-
view in place of Commission review is that the parties described in
section 57(e) are less closely related to the business development
company than those parties described in section 57(b); therefore,
there exists a lesser potential for overreaching and conflicts of in-
terests.1 32 A business development company thereby will be able to
enter quickly into certain transactions that previously were prohib-
ited under section 17 without Commission exemption orders. The
net result should be enhancement of the flow of equity capital to
eligible portfolio companies.
As previously discussed, venture capital companies have found
difficulties with the Commission's exemption procedures for those
prohibitions involving joint transactions,13 as defined in section
17(d). The prohibitions against joint transactions are now found in
sections 57(a)(4) 1 4 and (d)(4).135  Like section 17(d), sections
57(a) (4) and (d)(4) establish prohibitions against joint transactions
only to the extent that a transaction must comply with the rules
and regulations the Commission may promulgate for the protection
of investors."" Section 57(i)137 provides that until the Commission
tivities has been successful in other areas of the economy. Recently, there has evolved on
the corporate level the use of independent outside directors who oversee not only the inter-
ests of the shareholders, but also the interests of the employees and the community. See
Cohen, The Outside Director-Selection, Responsibilities, & Contribution to the Public
Corporation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 837 (1977). Independent directorial review also plays
a prominent role in the state-sponsored government programs of Alaska, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts. Alaska Renewable Resources Corporation, ALASKA STAT. §§ 37.12.010-
37.12.125 (1978); Connecticut Product Development Corporation Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §H
32-32-32-47 (Supp. 1980); The Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corpora-
tion, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40F §§ 1-5 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981). The purpose of
these programs is to provide state assistance for the development of new products, markets,
and technology which will result in increased employment and public revenues, thereby
strengthening the private sector of the state economy. Alaska Renewable Resources Corp.,
ALASKA STAT. § 37.12.015; Conn. Product Dev. Corp., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-33; Mass. Com-
munity Dev. Fin. Corp., MASS. ANN. LAws § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981). Any invest-
ments made by these state corporations must first be approved by their respective board of
directors. Alaska Renewable Resources Corp., ALASKA STAT. § 37.12.075; Conn. Product Dev.
Corp., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-36; Mass. Community Dev. Fin. Corp., MASS. ANN. LAWS § 2
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981).
132. Id. at 47.
133. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
134. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2280 (1980) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(a)(4)).
135. Id. at 94 Stat. 2282 (to be codified at15 U.S.C. § 80a-56(d)(4)).
136. Id. at 94 Stat. 2280, 2282 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-56(a)(4), (d)(4)).
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adopts rules and regulations under sections 57(a) and (d), their
terms will be subject to existing rules under sections 17(a) and (d).
Given that venture capital companies have not been able to oper-
ate efficiently pursuant to the rules and regulations established by
the Commission under section 17(d),' 38 venture capital companies
will presently remain unable to operate efficiently while complying
with the joint transaction prohibitions of sections 57(a)(4) and
(d)(4).
V. Conclusion
Although time will determine the full impact of the Small Busi-
ness Investment Incentive Act of 1980 upon the flow of equity cap-
ital to small, developing businesses, it is most likely that a much
larger, more stable, and better managed venture capital industry
will result. While market conditions and other factors have a
greater influence on the ability of small businesses to raise capital
than do Commission regulations, small businesses certainly can
benefit from an easing of the agency's rules. 39 Freeing the venture
capital industry from some of the constraints of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 is an important and positive step towards
halting the gradual economic deterioration that has recently
developed.
One of the more important revisions made in the 1940 Act con-
cerns the easing of the regulations restricting transactions between
an investment company and its affiliates. Newly enacted section
57, modeled after section 17, now governs affiliated transactions
entered into by a venture capital company, and at times, substi-
tutes directorial review in place of the lengthy process of Commis-
sion review. Although venture capital companies may still face
problems in entering joint and joint and several transactions, the
137. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2283 (1980) (to. be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
56(i)).
138. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
139. The effects of government action upon the flow of venture capital is well-docu-
mented. For example, when Congress reduced the capital gains rate in 1978 from 49% to
28%, an additional $1.2 billion flowed into the venture capital market. THE ECONOMIST, Apr.
5, 1980, at 70, col. 3. Conversely, when the Department of Labor issued a proposed ruling in
1979 that threatened to keep pension funds out of venture capital projects, there was a
considerable decrease in the flow of venture capital funds: Id.
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1980 Act now encourages venture capital companies to enter into
affiliated transactions which they previously would have avoided.
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